Friendly fire

The political and security order in Europe is disintegrating, leaving Keir Starmer with only hard choices

Towering columns

For The Times, Juliet Samuel argues that instead of fiddling with the numbers, European governments should rapidly rearm by untangling procurement.

A more modest and realistic aim for now would be for Europe to become self-sufficient in manufacturing the ammunition, land vehicles and missiles Ukraine’s war machine is most hungry for. The US is well on its way to quadrupling ammunition production, having quickly placed orders directly with its state-owned factories. But Washington is under pressure to keep up supplies to Israel and replenish its empty stockpiles before any dangerous brinkmanship kicks off in Asia. Making our own shells and tanks would relieve much of the burden Ukraine has placed on the US defence budget, lowering the temperature of the debate there.

Europe’s progress is painfully slow. Yes, the continent is making more shells than in 2022 (though even here, Brussels is accused of exaggerating). But governments are still dilly-dallying on signing the long-term contracts their defence companies need to justify building factories. Firing a large slice of Europe’s defence officials would probably help, followed by giving pay rises to the rest to stay in post at least for the length of a contract negotiation. If Europe were to get its act together, according to one industry optimist, we could easily ramp up to US levels within 18 months.

As for the continent’s industrial decline, the defence industry might as well be a beneficiary. With the right contracts and training incentives, workers from our shrinking chemicals sector could be retrained for work producing explosives precursors. North Sea oil workers, whom Ed Miliband is determined to throw onto the scrap heap, might be snapped up by undersea engineering firms defending our cables or detecting submarines — if those firms can get the financing to hire them before they go abroad or take to life as an Amazon worker. Car workers who find Chinese competition running their factories out of business might be redeployed into armoured vehicle or tank production. In other words, even our decline is rich with opportunity.

At UnHerd, Tom McTague considers how the new rush towards European strategic autonomy will be hampered by old ways of thinking.

The appeal of the Gaullist argument always lay in its apparent moral clarity and dignity. As Thomas Paine might have put it: There is something absurd in supposing a continent be perpetually governed by an Empire on the other side of the ocean. Perhaps, but the problem has never really been one of morality — rather the reality of national ambition lurking underneath. As de Gaulle said, Europe was not so much the means to make Europe great again, but France. It was, he said, the means for France to “become again what she has ceased to be since Waterloo: First in the world”.

Macron’s 2017 speech is a reminder that just beneath the European surface of French foreign policy lurks that old Gaullist national interest. As well as calling for European autonomy to protect the continent’s interests from an American withdrawal, Macron also called for the EU to develop a foreign policy focused above all on the Mediterranean and Africa, and for the euro to be placed at “the heart of Europe’s economic power in the world”. Neither of these priorities speaks in any way to the one country France would need to support a policy of European autonomy from the United States: Poland. In fact, the focus on the Mediterranean and Africa is a transparent attempt to use the power of the EU to pursue what are, in effect, French strategic concerns…

…Even today, many of the old instincts remain. Starmer’s hopes for a new defence and security pact, for example, are currently being held up by discussions over fishing rights. Those close to Starmer remain deeply sceptical that there will be any significant change in the EU’s willingness to compromise its single-market “red lines” in order to forge a closer relationship with Britain’s defence industry — something which could be a key asset in developing European military-industrial capacity. “The French see no benefit opening up the market to British competition,” one British official put it. The simple fact remains that whatever the rhetoric coming out of Berlin, Paris or Brussels about nuclear deals and “resets”, the old red-lines of the Brexit negotiations remain: if Britain wants more than it has today, it will have to accept the EU’s rules.

At Commonplace, Michael Lind examines how trade imbalances between Germany and the United States have shaped European geopolitics.

In a trade war between surplus and deficit countries, the surplus countries like Germany have the most to lose. To be sure, a country that tries to reduce its trade deficit by means of tariffs, quotas, or local-content requirements might inflict pain on domestic consumers of imported products or domestic businesses that rely on imported inputs, and higher prices might contribute to inflation. But import-substitution protectionism can also have a stimulative effect, as existing domestic businesses or domestic entrepreneurs and investors compete to fill the demand left by the exclusion of foreign products. At the same time, locked out of former markets, the surplus country is stuck with massive overcapacity in export industries and the prospect of mass unemployment or painful dislocation for their workers.

The Trump administration, then, in trying to preserve or rebuild particular American manufacturing industries, can threaten trading partners that run chronic bilateral merchandise trade deficits from a position of strength. The goal, shared by U.S. administrations from Obama’s to Trump’s, is rebalancing, with the manufacturing share of the U.S. economy growing somewhat while Germany manufactures less and expands its domestic service sector and domestic investment—if necessary, by unilateral American protectionist measures that deny the American market to German imports…

…It is hard to imagine that Germany, having resisted pressure for decades to gradually rebalance its economy by boosting domestic demand, borrowing to fund infrastructure investment, and attracting more FDI, will completely abandon its lucrative export-oriented model. A more likely scenario is one in which Germany responds to pressure from the U.S. in trade negotiations by agreeing to increase its military spending (enriching American defense contractors) and buying more American natural gas. For its part, the Trump administration could get a short-term boost from a combination of military Keynesianism, funded in part by arms purchases and military-base offsets by U.S. client-states, and more oil and gas exports.

For the Telegraph, Madeline Grant warns against the long-term costs of Indefinite Leave to Remain for British taxpayers and public services.

If left unchecked, combined with the “Boriswave”, ILR will prove a ticking time-bomb on the public finances. In an alarming briefing paper, Karl Williams of the Centre for Policy Studies places the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state of leaving ILR unchanged at £234 billion; equivalent to £8,200 for every UK household, spread across several decades. It equates to almost five times the defence budget, more than double education.

This is not to suggest that migrants working in the care sector aren’t performing vital work; and I mean no shade on the individuals concerned, who are merely reacting to incentives established by foolish politicians. But the long-term financial consequences are more than our indebted country can bear. Already, more people have come as dependants on the health and social care visa than through the visa itself (another Boris decision)…

…From a Left-wing perspective, the cost implications of unreformed ILR will fall on the poorest through increased competition for social housing, NHS waiting lists, even universal credit. Government might be forced to cut welfare across the board to meet ILR-associated costs. The obvious panic in the PM’s voice as he accused Reform UK of “dangerous Right-wing politics”, suggests he is at least beginning to grasp the threat.

At the New Statesman, George Eaton believes Keir Starmer’s shift on defence and immigration might signify a revival of Labour’s “old right”.

Starmer’s aversion to explicit ideology (“There is no such thing as Starmerism and there never will be”) has left commentators often struggling to locate his administration within Labour’s political universe. Some have seen the events of this week as further proof of the advance of Blue Labour, the group led by the peer Maurice Glasman (which I explored here), but there’s also an old-right flavour to this government. It is expanding workers’ rights, raising NHS spending and embracing hawkish stances on defence and immigration. This trajectory aligns it with the old right – which is both more economically interventionist and more socially conservative than New Labour (which often treated the unions as embarrassing relatives)…

…Labour First, which was founded in its current form in 1988, has established a parliamentary network led by MPs Luke Akehurst, another trusted McSweeney ally, and Gurinder Singh Josan, and Labour peers Spellar and Ruth Smeeth. “The left are still waiting in the wings to take advantage of any discord within the party,” it has warned, and to date more than 50 MPs have signed up.

As well as hosting parliamentary meetings and debates, the group aims to shield MPs from the threat of deselection in advance of the next election. Reeves, Defence Secretary John Healey (who has addressed Labour First meetings) and Home Secretary Yvette Cooper are seen as key allies. Don’t expect Labour First to seek headlines of the kind recently made by Blue Labour – it has always preferred to operate in the shadows and has no desire to act as a policy think tank. But the old right’s past and present help illuminate this government’s political character.

For the Telegraph, James Frayne urges the British Right not to focus on the Trump movement at the expense of domestic concerns.

What is relevant is that, to most British people, Trump’s Make America Great Again (Maga) movement looks inherently foreign and unfamiliar – excessively assertive and moralistic certain. To use an Americanism, “that isn’t how we roll” here. Most importantly, it seems excessively nationalistic – and like it is unthinkingly veering towards hostility to Britain. This is where it gets dangerous for the likes of Farage.

If Trump puts tariffs on Britain, people will be furious. While the US Government will justify tariffs as “business, not personal”, the British people will be horrified that a country that has committed troops and indeed moral capital behind American interests will have been so casually slapped in the face. To some extent, anger will follow if the US looks set to walk away from its role in European defence.

To be sure, British people will be sympathetic to Trump’s view that European countries have been taking the American presence (and spending) for granted, but they will be shocked at how easily the US is talking about walking away. It is not just these issues; Trump’s Government is wildly unpredictable on everything but the pursuit of the national interest. The chances of British people turning against Trump’s America are therefore high.

Wonky thinking

For the New York Times Magazine, David Leonhardt takes a deep dive into Danish politics where progressivism has thrived by embracing immigration restrictionism. The Social Democrats under Mette Frederiksen were elected in 2019 and have since kept office, protected the welfare state, expanded social and environmental policies, and sidelined the populist challenger party. Leonhardt reflects on what lessons this might yield for other countries.

Nearly a decade ago, after a surge in migration caused by wars in Libya and Syria, [Frederiksen] and her allies changed the Social Democrats’ position to be much more restrictive. They called for lower levels of immigration, more aggressive efforts to integrate immigrants and the rapid deportation of people who enter illegally. While in power, the party has enacted these policies. Denmark continues to admit immigrants, and its population grows more diverse every year. But the changes are happening more slowly than elsewhere. Today 12.6 percent of the population is foreign-born, up from 10.5 percent when Frederiksen took office. In Germany, just to Denmark’s south, the share is almost 20 percent. In Sweden, it is even higher.

These policies made Denmark an object of scorn among many progressives elsewhere. Critics described the Social Democrats as monstrous, racist and reactionary, arguing that they had effectively become a right-wing party on this issue. To Frederiksen and her aides, however, a tough immigration policy is not a violation of progressivism; to the contrary, they see the two as intertwined. As I sat in her bright, modern office, which looks out on centuries-old Copenhagen buildings, she described the issue as the main reason that her party returned to power and has remained in office even as the left has flailed elsewhere.

Leftist politics depend on collective solutions in which voters feel part of a shared community or nation, she explained. Otherwise, they will not accept the high taxes that pay for a strong welfare state. “Being a traditional Social Democratic thinker means you cannot allow everyone who wants to join your society to come,” Frederiksen says. Otherwise, “it’s impossible to have a sustainable society, especially if you are a welfare society, as we are.” High levels of immigration can undermine this cohesion, she says, while imposing burdens on the working class that more affluent voters largely escape, such as strained benefit programs, crowded schools and increased competition for housing and blue-collar jobs. Working-class families know this from experience. Affluent leftists pretend otherwise and then lecture less privileged voters about their supposed intolerance.

“There is a price to pay when too many people enter your society,” Frederiksen told me. “Those who pay the highest price of this, it’s the working class or lower class in the society. It is not — let me be totally direct — it’s not the rich people. It is not those of us with good salaries, good jobs.” She kept coming back to the idea that the Social Democrats did not change their position for tactical reasons; they did so on principle. They believe that high immigration helps cause economic inequality and that progressives should care above all about improving life for the most vulnerable members of their own society. The party’s position on migration “is not an outlier,” she told me. “It is something we do because we actually believe in it.”

As center-left parties elsewhere — including in the United States — try to find their way back to power, they will have to reckon with this dilemma. Immigration is likely to remain a defining political issue in coming years because poverty, political instability, climate change, trafficking networks and social media will continue to push residents of poor countries toward richer ones. Yes, those richer countries, where birthrates have plummeted, will need to admit immigrants to keep their economies functioning smoothly. But the approach that the United States and Western Europe have taken in recent decades has failed.

At Foreign Affairs, Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim explain why winning a conflict over Taiwan should not determine US grand strategy. Allowing China to annex Taiwan would harm Western credibility and cause global economic consequences, whereas entering a prolonged war would cost too much American blood and treasure. The authors make the case for a third option of enabling Taiwan to defend itself without US involvement whilst maintaining strategic ambiguity and supporting other allies in the region.

The United States rightly expends considerable resources to dissuade China from using coercion to control Taiwan. If China were to seize Taiwan, the United States would suffer significant military, economic, and reputational setbacks. China would gain a new foothold from which to project power across East Asia, complicating U.S. military operations in the region. Beijing could disrupt trade routes in the western Pacific, rattling the global economy. U.S. allies would have a new reason to question Washington’s commitment to their security. The repercussions would be greatest, of course, for the people of Taiwan, who would lose their vibrant democracy.

Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the benefits of preserving Taiwan’s de facto self-rule do not warrant the enormous human and economic costs of a U.S.-Chinese war. The United States’ vital interest lies in preventing China from attaining untrammeled regional hegemony in Asia. With such dominance, China could project large-scale military power into the Western Hemisphere or cut the United States off from Asia’s dynamic economic markets. But controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon. The United States would remain capable of rallying a counterbalancing coalition to impede any potential Chinese bid for political and military supremacy in Asia.

For one thing, the military advantages China would reap from taking Taiwan would not be that profound, and the United States and its allies would have time to adjust. Beijing could use control of the island to expand the reach of its missiles, air defenses, radars, and maritime and air surveillance systems, allowing the People’s Liberation Army to operate farther from China’s coast and more easily hold at risk U.S. military assets, including bases in Guam and vessels near Japan and the Philippines. But the PLA’s weapons can already reach these U.S. targets, so adding a few hundred more miles to their range would make only a marginal difference. China’s undersea gains would be similarly modest and unlikely to offset U.S. advantages. Seizing Taiwan would allow China to dock submarines in the deepwater ports off Taiwan’s eastern coast, which would extend their range and enable them to avoid some U.S. underwater sensors in the Miyako and Luzon Straits. They might not evade U.S. monitoring entirely, however, because satellites or sound surveillance in the region could probably detect them. Moreover, China may, in time, develop quieter submarines, and these could avoid U.S. detection without being launched from Taiwan.

Such limited operational gains would not give China the ability to bring about a dramatic regional expansion. Despite the fears of some in Tokyo and Manila, China would still face formidable obstacles to seizing outlying territories belonging to Japan or the Philippines—most of which are farther from Taiwan than Taiwan is from China—let alone more distant and populous islands, such as Okinawa or Kyushu in Japan or Luzon in the Philippines. Furthermore, it would take China years to build the infrastructure needed to use Taiwan as a base for military operations; the United States and its partners would have plenty of time to prepare additional defenses. In short, control of the island would hardly overturn the military balance in the region. Countries threatened by China’s rise have to invest in security measures no matter what happens in and around Taiwan…

…Some argue that the United States must fight for Taiwan because a failure to do so would undermine U.S. credibility, driving countries in the region closer to China. This seems unlikely. India and Japan, two of the United States’ cornerstone partners in the Indo-Pacific, have a deep history of animosity toward Beijing and tend to respond forcefully to Chinese aggression. To prevent Asian countries from aligning with Beijing if it takes Taiwan, the United States should stop reinforcing the idea that its reputation hinges on the defense of Taiwan. Instead, it should focus on its larger objective—preventing Chinese regional dominance—and stake its credibility on that.

Book of the week

We recommend The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict by Elbridge A. Colby. Author of the 2018 National Security Strategy and now nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Colby presented his thoughts in this 2022 work on how the United States and its allies should respond to the rise of China and organise its geopolitical priorities. Rooted in the realist tradition of foreign policy, it provides some insight into how the new Trump administration might shift its attention and resources from Europe to Asia.

The international arena in which the United States pursues these objectives remains anarchic, in the sense that there is no global sovereign to make and enforce judgments in a dispute. In this context, security, freedom, and prosperity cannot be taken for granted; they are not self-generating. This is for two reasons. First, in an ungoverned situation, actors may rationally seek advantage and profit by using force to take from or undermine others. Second, inherently vulnerable actors may find it prudent to take preventive action against potential threats: the best defense may be a good offense. These factors mean that the prospect of force shadows Americans’ pursuit of these goals.

To ensure its security, freedom, and prosperity, any country, including the United States, has a most powerful interest in ensuring a favorable balance of power with respect to its key interests. This is simply another way of saying that the most effective way to check another from doing something one does not want to abide is to be more powerful than the other is with respect to that interest. If one fails to maintain a favorable balance, one’s enjoyment of these goods will be at the sufferance of the one who enjoys the advantage.

Ensuring America’s security, freedom, and prosperity thus requires us to address the foundational role of power. To fulfill its core purposes, the United States should seek sustainably favorable military-economic balances of power with respect to the key regions of the world. In this chapter I will lay out the following key principles:

• Power in this context is composed of military-economic strength.

• The actors that matter most are states.

• Balances of power particularly matter in the key regions of the world, which are those where military-economic strength is clustered.

• The purpose of balancing is to deny another state hegemony over one of the key regions of the world.

• The favorable balance should be sustainable over time…

…The United States has reason to fear another state pursuing hegemony over one of the world’s key regions because regional hegemony is highly alluring; there are potent incentives for a state to seek it, especially if it does not face a sufficient counterforce. Because of these advantages, the strongest states within a region almost always seek predominance at some point. The history of modern Europe is a catalog of attempts by very powerful states to gain regional hegemony: the sixteenth-century Habsburg Monarchy, France under Louis XIV and then Napoleon, Second and Third Reich Germany, and the Soviet Union. China held regional sway in East Asia for much of recorded history, and Japan sought it after it leapt ahead of China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United States established effective regional hegemony in Central America and the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. We should not expect the contemporary environment to be different.

Because of Asia’s size and military-economic potential, ensuring that it is not subjected to such hegemony is of primary importance for the United States. Asia is once again, after a lapse of several centuries, the area of the world with the greatest total wealth and the greatest capacity to translate that wealth into military power. That another state might establish hegemony over significant parts of Asia is therefore the most concerning possible regional scenario for the United States.

Quick links

Data shows that 54% of 18-24-year-olds voted for a far-right or far-left party in Germany, but only 23% voted for the CDU and SPD…

…and the voting gap between German men and women aged under 30 has widened…

…and neighborhoods with a high share of migrants tended to vote for AfD while high-income neighborhoods with few migrants tended to vote for the Greens.

The Climate Change Committee predicts that 40% of greenhouse gas emissions will come from changes to people’s lifestyles.

Research discovered that more than 1 million foreign-born individuals claim some type of benefit, costing the UK at least £8 billion per year.

A record number of British passports were awarded last year to non-British citizens with a total 3.5 million passports handed out since 2004.

There are 18 local authorities exceeding the government cap whereby asylum seekers would not comprise more than one in every 200 local residents.

A Chinese tech giant will invest 380 billion yuan ($53 billion) in AI infrastructure over the next three years.

A survey revealed that 66% of European founders believe tech policy changes since 2020 have been unhelpful.

Average US tariff rates are rising to their highest level since the Great Depression.

43% of Americans view the UK as the biggest ally of the United States.

One-fifth of US government revenue goes towards interest payments.

UK export of dual-use items, such as radar parts and drone components, to Russia has continued despite sanctions…

…while Greek shipping oligarchs sold more oil tankers to Russia than anyone else…

…and the EU is buying more Russian fertiliser than pre-2022.

Official figures show that two-thirds of trans women prisoners are sex offenders.

Archaeologists unearthed “exceptional” Dionysus frescoes at Pompeii.